Can health insurance protect against out-of-pocket and catastrophic expenditures and also support poverty reduction? Evidence from Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme by Aryeetey, G.C. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/170048
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-07 and may be subject to
change.
RESEARCH Open Access
Can health insurance protect against out-
of-pocket and catastrophic expenditures
and also support poverty reduction?
Evidence from Ghana’s National Health
Insurance Scheme
Genevieve Cecilia Aryeetey1*, Judith Westeneng2, Ernst Spaan3, Caroline Jehu-Appiah4, Irene Akua Agyepong1
and Rob Baltussen3
Abstract
Background: Ghana since 2004, begun implementation of a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) to minimize
financial barriers to health care at point of use of service. Usually health insurance is expected to offer financial
protection to households. This study aims to analyze the effect health insurance on household out-of-pocket
expenditure (OOPE), catastrophic expenditure (CE) and poverty.
Methods: We conducted two repeated household surveys in two regions of Ghana in 2009 and 2011. We first
analyzed the effect of OOPE on poverty by estimating poverty headcount before and after OOPE were incurred.
We also employed probit models and use of instrumental variables to analyze the effect of health insurance on
OOPE, CE and poverty.
Results: Our findings showed that between 7–18 % of insured households incurred CE as a result of OOPE whereas
this was between 29–36 % for uninsured households. In addition, between 3–5 % of both insured and uninsured
households fell into poverty due to OOPE. Our regression analyses revealed that health insurance enrolment
reduced OOPE by 86 % and protected households against CE and poverty by 3.0 % and 7.5 % respectively.
Conclusion: This study provides evidence that high OOPE leads to CE and poverty in Ghana but enrolment into
the NHIS reduces OOPE, provides financial protection against CE and reduces poverty. These findings support the
pro-poor policy objective of Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme and holds relevance to other low and
middle income countries implementing or aiming to implement insurance schemes.
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Background
The reliance on out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE) to
finance health care is a common feature in many low
and middle income countries (LMICs). Households
without adequate financial protection face the risk of in-
curring large unforeseen medical expenditures should
they fall ill. These unforeseen expenditures sometimes
may lead to indebtedness and reduction in living stan-
dards leading to poverty [1–6]. The quest for financial
protection to minimize the extent to which households
incur catastrophic expenditure (CE) and are pushed into
poverty due to high medical spending has received a lot
of attention. More recently, health insurance has been
put forward as an instrument to provide financial pro-
tection and to achieve universal coverage [7–11].
Again, although evidence in many LMICs suggest that
the insured sometimes incur high out-of- pocket expen-
ditures, sometimes large enough to push them into
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catastrophe [9, 12–15], studies on the effect of health in-
surance on poverty reduction in particular is limited in
many LMIC settings, including Ghana. We set out to
answer the following questions: (1) Does OOPE for
health care lead to poverty at the household level? (2)
Does health insurance reduce OOPE, CE and poverty at
the household level? This study adds to existing literature
on evidence of the effect of health insurance on poverty,
OOPE and CE using various econometric techniques.
Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme
In 2004, Ghana began implementation of a National
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) as part of the govern-
ment’s policy to minimize the financial burden of OOPE
at point of service and to ensure equitable access to
health care, particularly among the poor. The NHIS is
publically financed by a single pooled National Health
Insurance Fund. The fund has three main sources: tax
revenue in the form of a 2.5 % VAT which contributes
about 70 % of the fund, 2.5 % of contributions of Social
Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) contrib-
utors who are formal sector workers; and which contrib-
utes about 20 % of the fund; and out-of-pocket income
adjusted premiums ranging from GHS7.2-GHS48
(US$ 2-US$12) for non SSNIT contributors. In addition,
apart from certain exempt groups, a registration fee pay-
ment is a requirement before obtaining a new card or
renewing an old one. The fund is used to pay for health
services, administration of the NHIS and premium ex-
emptions for pregnant women and their newborn, chil-
dren under 18 years and the aged over 70 years as well as
those successfully identified as too poor to pay (i.e. indi-
gent). The challenge remains regarding how to identify
the indigents for premium exemptions prior to enrolment
[16, 17]. Apart from beneficiaries of the livelihood em-
powerment against poverty (LEAP) [18], a conditional
cash transfer program, the identification of indigents
leaves a large amount of discretion to the staff of the dis-
trict scheme offices.
The scheme requires by law for all nationals resident
in the country to enroll. However it has not been pos-
sible to enforce compulsory enrolment/re-enrolment
given the large informal sector. Also, the annual enrol-
ment and renewal arrangements that require subscribers
to present at an enrolment outlet to pay registration fees
and/or premiums and then receive an insurance card or
have their card endorsed present a barrier to the com-
pulsory enrolment/re-enrolment policy [19].
The purchaser arrangements of the scheme are man-
aged at the national level by the National Health Insur-
ance Authority (NHIA) and peripherally by its regional
and district branch offices. Services are provided through
contractual arrangements with public and private pro-
viders, pharmacies and diagnostic services. The NHIS
benefit package covers range of services including out-
patient and inpatient care, some aspects of oral health,
eye care, maternity care and emergencies. It excludes
cosmetic services, HIV anti-retroviral medicines, ortho-
pedics, and organ transplant among others. According
to the scheme, over 95 % of disease conditions are cov-
ered under the scheme [20].
Since the introduction of the scheme, enrolment has
increased from 6 % in 2005 to 38 % in 2014. Similarly,
utilization of health services by the insured have also in-
creased. According to Ghana Health Service annual re-
ports, the proportion of OPD attendance by insured
clients increased from 55.81 % in 2010 to 82.11 % in
2011, OPD per capita increased from 0.98 in 2010 to
1.14 in 2012. The improvement observed may be largely
due to increase in access to health care and increasing
demand for health services and existing enrolment on
the National Health Insurance Scheme [21, 22].
Similarly, Ghana’s recent living standards survey in
2012 (GLSS VI) revealed that the country’s poverty pro-
file has declined since 2006 from 31.9 % to 24.2 % in
2013, with the Northern, Upper East and Upper West
regions recording higher poverty incidence above 70 %.
The other regions on average showed a general decline
from 24.7 % in 2005 to 20.5 % in 2012 [23].
Methods
Study setting, sampling and data collection
This study was part of a bigger research project explor-
ing options to better reach the poor with health insur-
ance. It involved qualitative and quantitative inquiry into
identification of barriers to enrolment and implementa-
tion of an intervention to improve enrolment. An impact
evaluation of the intervention was undertaken, the re-
sults of which have been reported elsewhere [24]. Two
rounds of survey were conducted in the Eastern (ER)
and Central (CR) regions of Ghana in 2009 and 2011 at
baseline and endline respectively. These are two adjacent
regions in Southern Ghana and are characterized by a
mixed rural and urban populations, relatively similar so-
cioeconomic, demographic and cultural characteristics.
The central region lies within the coastal belt of the
country with population of around 1.8 million and poverty
incidence of 23.4 % in 2006. The Eastern region lies to the
east of the country with an estimated population of 2.3
million and poverty incidence of 17.8 % in 2006 [25].
With respect to sampling, we drew our sample using a
three-stage sampling procedure. The target was to col-
lect information from 3,000 households in total from
both regions. First, all the 30 districts from the two re-
gions were selected (i.e. 17 from ER and 13 from CR).
Second, one census enumeration area (EA), demarcated
by the Ghana Statistical services was randomly selected
from each district, using a set of computer generated
Aryeetey et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:116 Page 2 of 11
random numbers [26]. One EA per district was selected
in order to measure variations across the districts. Each
district is made up of a number of EAs sometimes classi-
fied according to communities. Thus an EA can be a
whole community and also a community may have more
than one EA depending on the size. Third, we mapped
and numbered all residential structures within the se-
lected EAs out of which 110 households were randomly
selected. A total of 3,300 (110 by 30 EAs) households
were involved in our survey with 13,857 individuals at
baseline in 2009. In the 2011 follow-up survey 149
households were lost reducing our sample to 3,152
households with 12,810 individuals. Lost households
were mainly those that had relocated to other communi-
ties or single household members who have died.
We collected data one-time from households in the
two periods (i.e. 2009 and 2011) with 1 month recall for
information on household expenditure, expenditure on
health and income variables. Other variables to which
data was collected include insurance status, asset owner-
ship, education, employment, locality, health status,
health services patronized, i.e. outpatient and in-patient
services among others. We used expenditure rather than
income because it has been observed over time that in
many developing countries setting, the use of income for
socioeconomic measures can be unreliable.
Analysis
Effect of OOPE on CE and poverty
Following the methodology developed by O’Donnell et
al. 2008 on the poverty impact of OOPE [2, 27], we ana-
lyzed the effect of OOPE on poverty by estimating and
comparing the poverty headcount before (pre) and after
(post) OOPE for health care were incurred. Following
international literature on poverty measurements [28],
we defined our poverty line as the estimated consump-
tion level needed to satisfy minimum subsistence need.
We set this line at GH¢60.72 (US$ 43.4) which was the
mean monthly food expenditure of our sample. House-
holds whose total expenditure was equal to or below this
minimum were considered poor. We illustrate the effect
of OOPE on poverty using Pen’s parade [27, 29]. The
Pen’s parade is a line chart showing the distribution of
pre and post OOPE and the poverty line by ranking
households in ascending order of total income or ex-
penditure. The parade visualizes the distribution of
households that fall below the poverty line due to
OOPE.
Effect of insurance on OOPE, CE and poverty
All analyses were conducted at the household level
applying panel data techniques. We defined OOPE as
household health expenditures incurred for both in
and out-patient services including expenditure on
medicines, transport, diagnostics and under-the- table
payments if incurred. We used the methodology pro-
posed by WHO to estimate CE [30, 31] and we de-
fined household spending to be catastrophic if OOPE
equaled or exceeded a certain payment capacity
threshold i.e. 40 % of non-food consumption expend-
iture (also known as capacity to pay). Non-food
consumption expenditure was calculated as total ex-
penditures less food expenditure. We used the same
definition of poverty described in the previous section
on effect of OOPE on poverty. The recall period for
expenditure data was within the last 30 days prior to
the surveys. In all analyses of expenditure, we ad-
justed for household size using adult equivalence
scale formula equivalence size = (household size)β
where β = 0.56 [32].
Health insurance has been identified in the literature
to be a potentially endogenous variable that determines
OOPE, CE or poverty [13, 33–35]. That is, households
with relatively high health expenditures are likely to en-
roll. In addition, poverty is a likely determinant of health
insurance enrolment for financial protection. Bearing
this in mind, we undertook several types of analyses to
test for the potential endogeneity of health insurance in
our data and if it exist to address it. First assuming in-
surance to be exogenous, we applied the random effects
model to analyze the effect of health insurance on
OOPE and the probit model for the effect of health
insurance on CE and poverty with CE and poverty as
binary outcome variables. To address the potential endo-
geneity of health insurance, we used instrumental vari-
able (IV) analysis and applied the two stage least squares
(2SLS) for effect of insurance on OOPE and two stage
residual inclusion (2SRI) for analysis of effect of insur-
ance on CE and poverty. The 2SRI is the method recom-
mended when the outcome and predictor variables are
binary in an IV model. In the 2SLS model, the first stage
proceeds by running a linear model of the endogenous
variable with identified instruments. In the second stage,
the residuals from the first stage are included in a linear
model of the outcome variable and other explanatory
variables. Similarly in the 2SRI model, the first stage pro-
ceeds with running a non-linear regression of insurance
on the covariate vector and the instruments. Then
the residuals from the first stage regression are incor-
porated into a non-linear regression of outcome (CE
and poverty) on the covariate vector, insurance and
the residuals [36–38].
OOPE, CE and poverty can be written as a function of
health insurance and other exogenous explanatory vari-
ables as follows:
OOPE 2SLS IV model
Y ij ¼ β1Iij þ β2Tij þ εij ð1Þ
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Iij ¼ α1Zij þ α2Xij þ μij ð2Þ
CE and poverty 2SRI model:
CPij ¼ β1Iij þ β2Tij þ εij
CPij ¼ 1 if CPij > 0
CPIJ ¼ 0 otherwise
ð3Þ
Iij ¼ α1Zij þ α2Xij þ μij
I ij ¼ 1 if IIJ > 0
Iij ¼ 0 otherwise
ð4Þ
Where Y is out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE), I is
household health insurance status, T is a vector of other
independent variables (or covariates). Z is a vector of in-
strumental variables predicting health insurance but not
OOPE. X is a vector of exogenous variables from the
OOPE equation. CP is a dummy dependent variable for
catastrophic expenditures or poverty. α and β are set of
parameters characterizing the function while i is the
panel variable and j the time variable. Following from
existing literature, the following control variables were
employed in our analysis: Year (dummy for year 2009),
locality (dummy for rural locality), out-patient and in-
patient use of health service (dummy), consumption
expenditure (continuous), household head characteris-
tics including age (continuous), sex, education (four
dummies with base of no education) employment status
(four dummies with base of casual work) and health status
(dummy with base of poor health status).
Test for the endogeneity of health insurance and
instrumental variables
The Hausman endogeneity test evaluates whether
there are systematic differences between the estimates
obtained from the naïve (exogenous) model and the
IV estimates [39]. Rejecting the null hypothesis sug-
gests the presence of endogeneity and therefore the
use of an IV approach. Also, for the IV estimates to
improve over the naïve (exogenous) equation esti-
mates, it is fundamental that instruments satisfy two
condition: (a) relevance, that is, instruments must be
correlated with and have a sufficient explanatory power
for the endogenous variable: (b) validity, that is, instru-
ments must not have a direct effect on the outcome in the
second stage so that they can be excluded from the main
(second stage) equation [33, 40–42].
We identified possible instrumental variables based
on theory and existing literature. Our study sample was
drawn from a randomized controlled trial to analyze
the effect of a community intervention on enrolment,
described in the methods section, and we employed
household participation in the intervention as an in-
strumental variable. Because of the randomization
process, we considered participation in the intervention
to be exogenous of OOPE, CE and poverty. We repre-
sented the intervention by a dummy variable if the
household belonged to the intervention community. In
addition we considered other instruments such as price
of insurance, community enrolment rate, location of
scheme office, attitude of health personnel towards in-
sured and uninsured client and community beliefs
about insurance.
Test for random or fixed effects 2SLS
The precondition for using random effects are (i) that
observations are drawn randomly from a given popu-
lation and (ii) that the unobserved effect be distrib-
uted independently across Xj variables. We used the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to determine whether to
use the random or fixed effects 2SLS analysis. Under
this test, the null hypothesis is that the preferred
model is the random effects and alternative hypoth-
esis is fixed effects. Rejecting the null hypothesis
means fixed effects model is preferred [43].
Results
Characteristics of sample
The socio-economic characteristics of households in
2009 and 2011 are presented in Table 1. Since we con-
ducted a repeated survey over the same households,
moderate differences were reported in variables such as
age, education, sex and occupation. Household nominal
welfare levels improved considerably between the survey
periods illustrated by an increase in mean monthly in-
comes from GH¢187 (US$133) in 2009 to GH¢307
(US$219) in 2011. Poverty levels declined from 34 % to
20 % while household enrolment into the NHIS in-
creased from 31 % to 37 %.
Effect of OOPE on CE and poverty
Mean OOPE for out-patient services for the entire
sample increased from GH¢ 23 to GH¢33 and from
GH¢ 51 to GH¢62 for in-patient services between
2009 and 2011. Household incidence of CE declined
from 27 % in 2009 to 12 % in 2011 (Table 1). This
decline in CE was significantly more for insured than
uninsured households. Between 18 % and 7 % of in-
sured households incurred CE and between 36 % and
29 % of uninsured households incurred CE in 2009
and 2011 respectively (Table 2). The effect of poverty
on OOPE revealed that some 3–5 % of both insured
and uninsured households fell into poverty between
2009 and 2011. Figures 1 and 2 provide an illustra-
tion of the effect by insured and uninsured house-
holds using the Pen’s parade.
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Effect of insurance on OOPE, CE and poverty
The result from the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggests
the use of the random effects to analyze OOPE. The
Hausman test of endogeneity suggests the presence of
endogeneity of insurance and we thus used several in-
struments to address the issue. We settled on inter-
vention as the main instrumental variable for our
analysis based on its best performance on relevance
and validity. A summary of the test carried out are
provided in Appendix D.
Table 3 provides a summary of the effect of health
insurance on OOPE, CE, expenditure and poverty.
The full model is provided in the Appendix including
the test on validity of instrumental variables used the
analyses. Our results revealed that enrolment into
health insurance reduces household OOPE by 86 %
(=e-1.984-1) [44]. The effect of health insurance is pro-
tective i.e. insured households were 3 % less likely to
incur CE and 7.5 % less likely to fall into poverty.
With regard to the other explanatory variables, our
findings showed that households who used both in-
patient and out-patient services were more likely to
incur OOPE. The effect was greatest for households
using in-patient services. Also households with good
perceived health status were likely to spend significantly
less (44 %) on health payments compared to those with
poor health status. For CE, households were 5 % more
likely to incur CE when using out-patient services while
this was 19 % when using in-patient services. Similarly
for poverty, use of out-patient services increased the
probability of households falling into poverty by 4 % as
against 16 % for use of in-patient services. In addition
large households and households with unemployed in-
dividuals were more likely to fall into poverty and hav-
ing higher education reduced the incidence of poverty.
The details of the results for all models are provided in
the Appendix.
Discussion
Our study was motivated by the policy focus of reaching
Ghana’s population with health insurance especially
among poor households and the benefits thereof such as
reduction in OOPE, CE and poverty over time. We dis-
cuss noteworthy findings.
First, enrolment into health insurance reduced
household OOPE by 86 %. At the same time, some
insured households incurred OOPE sometimes high
enough to be catastrophic. In our study, in 2011 the
average OOPE for out-patient services were GHS 26.1
and GHS 53.5 for insured and uninsured households
respectively and the average OOPE for in-patient ser-
vices were GHS 65.9 and GHS 60.2 for insured and
uninsured households. Thus despite the good news
about the protective effect of the NHIS and given
Table 1 Household socio-economic characteristics
2009 2011 Difference
(p-value)
Mean household size 4.211 4.066 0.145 (0.513)
Locality (%)
Rural 1,876 (60.0) 1,876 (60.0) 0 (1.000)
Urban 1,252 (40.0) 1,252 (40.0) 0 (1.000)
Household head characteristics
Sex (%)
Male 2,016 (64.5) 1,970 (63.0) 46 (0.361)
Female 1,112 (35.6) 1,158 (37.0) 46 (0.361)
Marital status (%)
Never married 508 (16.2) 486 (15.5) 22 (0.496)
Married 1,997 (63.8) 1,975 (63.1) 2 (0.633)
Divorced 623 (19.2) 667 (21.3) 44 (0.256)
Religion
Christian 2,715 (86.9) 2,776 (88.8) 61 (0.484)
Muslim 195 (6.2) 201 (6.4) 6 (0.948)
Traditional 57 (1.8) 41 (1.3) 16 (0.507)
None 159 (5.1) 107 (3.4) 52 (0.171)
Education (%)
None 816 (26.1) 816 (26.1) 0 (1.000)
Primary 684 (21.9) 649 (20.8) 35 (0.740)
Secondary 1,341 (42.9) 1,391 (44.5) 50 (0.750)
Tertiary 287 (9.2) 272 (8.7) 15 (0.912)
Occupation (%)
Farmer/fisherman 1,157 (37.0) 1,200 (38.4) 43 (0.883)
Casual worker 179 (5.7) 228 (7.3) 49 (0.541)
Student/retired 159 (5.1) 176 (5.6) 17 (0.656)
Self/government employed 1,514 (48.5) 1,422 (45.5) 92 (0.699)
Unemployed 116 (3.7) 100 (3.2) 16 (0.584)
Household welfare GH¢ (SE)
Mean monthly income 187.2 (4.1) 306.8 (5.8) 245.6 (0.000)
Mean monthly expenditure 181.9 (5.6) 358.3 (6.2) 268.1 (0.000)
Headcount poverty 34.4 20.2 27.4 (0.000)
Household health
expenditure GH¢ (SE)
Mean OOPE: OPD 23.0 (1.9) 32.6 (3.4) 25.7 (0.009)
Mean OOPE: IPD 51.0 (6.7) 62.2 (14.4) 53.5 (0.425)
Incidence of catastrophic
health expenditure
27 % 12 % 15 (0.000)
Insurance Status (%)
Insured 986 (31.2) 1,176 (37.5) 190 (0.000)
Uninsured 2,142 (68.5) 1,952 (62.4) 190 (0.000)
Exchange rate GH¢1.45: US$1 SE: Standard errors
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that the NHIS policy in theory does not include co-
payments, sometimes significant OOPE are taking
place especially for inpatient care. One potential ex-
planation is that Ghana’s NHIS benefit package is
fairly comprehensive and covers 80–90 % of the most
common conditions in Ghana. There are still excluded
conditions and these account for the co-payments. How-
ever, since our data shows that co-payments are occurring
for both in-patient and out-patient services of all kinds in-
cluding those covered by insurance, clearly the conditions
excluded are not the only reason for out-of-pocket spend-
ing and may not even be the major reason. Though in the-
ory there are not supposed to be co-pays or balance
billing under the NHIS, anecdotal reports and some stud-
ies have reports of insured clients being given prescrip-
tions to purchase medicines in the benefit package, with
the reason that these are not available in stock and need
to be paid for privately with related complaints by pro-
viders that NHIS indebtedness makes them unable to
stock medicines [45]. There is similarly anecdotal evidence
of insured clients preferring to leave their cards at home
and rather pay out of pocket to get faster treatment. There
are similar reports of informal fees. Any or a mixture of
these reasons could explain the high out of pocket expen-
ditures. A similar study in Uganda on why CE remained
the same for the poor after removal of user fees found
that informal payments in public facilities increased
to ‘compensate’ providers for revenue lost from user
fees [46, 47].
Second, one of the key objectives of health insur-
ance, as stated in the introduction, is to provide fi-
nancial protection and minimize the extent to which
households incur CE due to health spending. From
our analysis, we found that health insurance was pro-
tective against households incurring CE. We demon-
strated that insured households were 3 % less likely
to fall into CE. Though the marginal effects of insur-
ance is relatively low, our outcome is a promising
one as it shows the potential of Ghana’s NHIS in
achieving financial protection for its enrolled clients.
The international evidence on the financial protection ef-
fect of insurance on CE is mixed. For example Galarraga
et al. 2010 [13] found that households in Mexico were
54 % less likely to incur CE, Saskena et al. 2006 [12]
Table 2 Poverty effect of OOPE and household health expenditures by insured and uninsured
2009 2011
Insured Uninsured |t| > 0 Insured Uninsured |t| > 0
Pre-payment headcount poverty (%) 27.9 37.2 0.000 13.8 23.9 0.000
Post-payment headcount poverty (%) 30.8 42.2 0.000 17.1 26.7 0.000
Diff. in pre and post headcount poverty (%) 2.9 4.9 0.006 2.8 3.3 0.421
Catastrophic expenditure (%) 18.4 36.1 0.000 7.1 28.7 0.000
Mean OOPE_OPD (SE) 19.8 (3.1) 27.2 (2.4) 0,058 26.1 (9.2) 53.5 (3.2) 0,001
Mean OOPE_IPD (SE) 42.5 (10.9) 58.5 (8.2) 0.235 65.9 (18.5) 50.2 (11.9) 0.646
OOPE Out of pocket expenditure, OPD Out-patient services, IPD In-patient services
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reported a decline in CE from 19.1 % to 8.5 % for house-
holds in the lowest quintile in Kenya, Nguyen et al. 2011
[15] also reported a reduction in CE in Ghana. Studies by
Dong et al. 1999 and Wagstaff et al. 2008 [48, 49] however
found insurance to lead to increased out-of-pocket and
catastrophic payments in China because insurance en-
couraged people to seek care when sick and also to seek
care from higher-level providers.
Third, despite a general decline in poverty between
2009 and 2011 (i.e. 34 % to 20 %), OOPE on health
care pushed some 3–5 % of households into poverty
supporting existing evidence. Expenditures related to
in-patient services were the main drivers of house-
holds further into poverty [2, 50, 51]. Analyzing the
effect of insurance in providing financial protection
against poverty, our study revealed that being insured
reduces household’s probability of falling into poverty
by 7.5 %. This outcome is of relevance to policy as it
shows the potential of health insurance to contribute
to poverty reduction. Though there is limited evi-
dence of the effect of health insurance on poverty,
our findings compares to some studies where impact
of health insurance on poverty were discussed
through the channel of reduced CE leading to reduc-
tion in poverty. They included studies in Senegal [52]
and Vietnam [11].
Our study has a number of limitations in interpret-
ation of the results. First, our short recall period of
30 days prior to the survey may underestimate health
payments if utilization during that period was low.
Nonetheless, shorter recall period enabled respon-
dents to provide reliable payment responses. Second,
income was not used as a measure of people’s wealth
in this study for the following reasons. A majority of
households visited were informal sector workers with
unstable income. The instability of this variable may
inform biased socioeconomic status for the household
at the point of data collection. Socially and culturally,
people have reservations for reporting their incomes
for fear of taxes and other beliefs. People are also
likely to under report or over report depending on
the impression they wish to make on the interviewer.
Some studies have applied subjective income as a
measure of household wellbeing to address this limi-
tation [53, 54]. Third our model on OOPE was a ran-
dom effects model and it may be possible that issues
of unobserved heterogeneity may be present and may
have affected our findings. Yet statistical tests indi-
cated the use of random effects model for analysis of
OOPE. This may have accounted for the large effect
of insurance on OOPE [43]. For the analysis of the
effect of insurance on CE and poverty (binary outcomes),
to the best of our knowledge only random effects and
population average models are available for longitudinal
probit model estimation and were employed as such.
Conclusions
In conclusion, our study provides further confirm-
ation of the existing body of evidence that high
OOPE pushes people into poverty. Importantly, it
also shows that the Ghana NHIS is effectively pro-
viding significant financial protection for households
and reducing their likelihood of incurring CE and
falling into poverty. The NHIS is therefore achieving
to some extent its pro-poor objectives. However, in-
sured clients are still making out-of-pocket payments
even though the level is significantly lower than the
uninsured clients. In some cases the OOPE payments
of insured clients are large enough relative to their
income to be catastrophic and tip households into
poverty. Hence there is room for improving the ex-
tent to which the NHIS is attaining its pro-poor ob-
jectives. Further work is required to understand the
issues, design and implement appropriate interven-
tions. Indeed, currently, the NHIS in Ghana is has
employed some researchers, including a co-author of
this manuscript to gather evidence on providers and
insurers engagements to confirm or dispute issues
such as the insured having to pay for services and
also concerns of under-the-the table payment by the
insured. These observations and lessons from this
study are of relevance to inform considerations in
design and implementation of the NHIS in Ghana
and also to other LMICs considering introduction of
health insurance to achieve effective financial protec-
tion for their citizens.
Table 3 Summary results of effect of health insurance on OOPE, expenditure, CE and poverty
OOPE CE POVERTY
Coefficient Probability† Coefficient ME Coefficient ME
IV estimates
2-Stage Least Squares −1.984** −0.862
2-Stage Residual Inclusion −0.637*** −0.031 −0.225*** −0.075
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01: ME-marginal effects; †calculated as (eβ-1): effect of dummy variable in a semi-logarithmic equations where β is the regression coefficient
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Table 4 Effect of insurance on household out-of-pocket
expenditure (OOPE)
Dependent variable: Log OOPE (1) (2)
Naïve model 2SLS
Insurance −0.749*** −1.984**
(0.063) (0.647)
Log income 0.279*** 0.355***
(0.045) (0.060)
Age 0.001 0.012*
(0.002) (0.006)
Male −0.011 −0.124
(0.067) (0.089)
Household size −0.047*** −0.044**
(0.012) (0.013)
Rural locality −0.238*** −0.204**
(0.068) (0.070)
Year 2009 0.323*** 0.459***
(0.069) (0.104)
Good health status −0.487*** −0.574***
(0.097) (0.121)
Use of out-patient services 0.317*** 0.470***
(0.061) (0.106)
Use of in-patient services 0.964*** 1.009***
(0.141) (0.148)
Occupation: Farmer −0.049 −0.164
(0.095) (0.118)
Government/Self-employed −0.024 −0.066
(0.096) (0.109)
Unemployed −0.049 −0.099
(0.163) (0.182)
Education level: Primary −0.129 −0.155
(0.085) (0.088)
Secondary −0.039 0.100
(0.079) (0.108)
Tertiary 0.030 0.418
(0.124) (0.248)
Constant 1.270*** 1.050**
(0.289) (0.333)
Observations 2,318 2,301
R-squared 0.153
Number of households 1,844 1,833
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; 2SLS-2 Stage
Least Squares
Table 5 Effect of insurance on catastrophic expenditure
Naive model 2SRI
Coefficient ME Coefficient ME
Insurance −0.739*** −0.036 −0.637*** −0.031
(0.098) (0.101)
Age 0.001 0.000 0.008** 0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
Male −0.106 −0.006 −0.161* −0.009
(0.069) (0.071)
Household size −0.039** −0.002 −0.037* −0.002
(0.015) (0.015)
Rural locality −0.086 −0.004 −0.080 −0.004
(0.070) (0.071)
Year 2009 0.632*** 0.037 0.581*** 0.033
(0.071) (0.073)
Good health status −0.959*** −0.122 −1.046*** −0.138
(0.119) (0.125)
Use of out-patient services 0.501*** 0.046 0.543*** 0.050
(0.149) (0.149)
Use of in-patient services 1.235*** 0.152 1.410*** 0.188
(0.078) (0.086)
Occupation: Farmer 0.043 0.002 −0.037 −0.002
(0.105) (0.109)
Government/
Self employed
−0.074 −0.004 −0.085 −0.004
(0.109) (0.109)
Unemployed −0.114 −0.006 −0.169 −0.008
(0.176) (0.176)
Education: Primary −0.128 −0.007 −0.132 −0.007
(0.085) (0.086)
Secondary −0.284*** −0.016 −0.170* −0.009
(0.083) (0.085)
Tertiary −0.294* −0.013 −0.013 −0.001
(0.148) (0.162)
Residual −1.034*** −0.057
(0.236)
Constant −0.990*** −0.936***
(0.205) (0.211)
Observations 6,448 6,406
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05: ME- marginal
effects 2SRI-2-Stage Residual Inclusion
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Table 6 Effect of insurance on poverty
Naive model 2SRI
Coefficient ME Coefficient ME
Insurance −0.289*** −0.096 −0.225*** −0.075
(0.040) (0.043)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Male −0.200*** −0.069 −0.234*** −0.081
(0.041) (0.042)
Household size 0.056*** 0.019 0.058*** 0.019
(0.008) (0.008)
Rural locality 0.285*** 0.101 0.290*** 0.102
(0.041) (0.041)
Year 2009 0.476*** 0.161 0.436*** 0.147
(0.034) (0.035)
Good health status −0.131 −0.046 −0.179* −0.063
(0.078) (0.079)
Use of out-patient services 0.019 0.006 0.114* 0.040
(0.047) (0.052)
Use of in-patient services 0.406** 0.151 0.429** 0.160
(0.133) (0.134)
Occupation: Farmer −0.030 −0.101 −0.088 −0.029
(0.060) (0.061)
Government/Self employed −0.264*** −0.089 −0.280*** −0.095
(0.060) (0.060)
Unemployed 0.322** 0.117 0.282** 0.102
(0.106) (0.108)
Education: Primary −0.241*** −0.079 −0.240*** −0.079
(0.052) (0.052)
Secondary −0.356*** −0.119 −0.291*** −0.098
(0.046) (0.049)
Tertiary −0.997*** −0.248 −0.811*** −0.216
(0.091) (0.100)
Residual −0.608*** −0.208
(0.136)
Constant −0.408** −0.363**
(0.126) (0.127)
Observations 6,448 6,406
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05: ME- marginal effects 2SRI-2-Stage Residual Inclusion
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